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jail simply because he had the misfortune of witnessing a crime. 30
The situation does not become more fair, but perhaps more justified,
upon an examination of the rights involved. While an individual has
a right to freedom from imprisonment, the people of a state, through
the prosecution, have a right to enforce their laws and punish violators
thereof. This end could easily be frustrated if the courts -were powerless
to compel the attendance of a material witness at the trial. Further, it
must be considered that there are several safeguards provided for such
a witness. He has the benefit of a judicial hearing to determine his
status as a material witness. If he is of good character, probably all
that will be required of him is his personal recognizance without surety.
If, however, surety is required of him, it must not be excessive. Therefore, it is only in extreme circumstances that the witness will actually
be committed to jail, which confinement may last only a reasonable
time.
ROBERT ODLIN COYLE

PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCE TO PAROLE
IN ARGUMENT TO JURY
Where the purpose or effect of a prosecuting attorney's reference to
parole or pardon is to convey the impression to the jury that the consequences of its verdict are of little importance since its errors will be
corrected on appeal to some other body, the verdict may well be reversed.
The consequence of such remarks made by the prosecuting attorney was considered as one of first impression by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Shoemaker v. State,' involving a conviction of
rape. During his argument to the jury, the state's attorney stated that
rape is punishable by death,2 but that the state was not asking for
this penalty, the practical effect of which was to take away from the
-10The Uniform Act to Secure The Attendance of Witnesses From Without A
State in Criminal Proceedings, 9 U.L.A. 86, presents some clarification to the situation, but still offers no remedy other than imprisonment to compel a recalcitrant
witness's attendance.
1228 Md. 462, 18o A.2d 682 (1962).
sUpon a verdict of "guilty" in a Maryland trial for rape, the court may sentence the prisoner to death or life imprisonment in the penitentiary, or to confinement in the penitentiary for a term of not less than eighteen months nor more
than twenty-one years. Md. Ann. Code art. 27 § 461 (1957).
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jury any function in fixing the penalty.3 Continuing, he told the jury
that on a verdict of guilty without capital punishment, the court
would be required to sentence the defendant to the penitentiary for
eighteen months to twenty years and it would become the obligation
of the Parole Board to consider the defendant's eligibility for parole
after he had served one third of his sentence, 4 or that the Governor
could pardon him or commute his sentence even before he had served
one third of his sentence. 5
After the jury returned a verdict of guilty without capital punishment, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of twenty
years in the penitentiary.
The court granted the prisoner a delayed appeal under the Post
Conviction Procedure Act, 6 finding that he was not at fault in failing
7
to file a direct appeal.
The Court of Appeals held that the state attorney's remarks regarding parole constituted reversible error, since:
"[T]he natural tendency and effect of the statements about parole was to suggest to the members of the jury that they might
resolve any question about the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt with the thought that, even if they made a
mistake, no great harm would be done since he might soon
be paroled."s
'The jury may add the words "without capital punishment" to a verdict of
guilty. If the jury renders such a verdict, the court must sentence the prisoner to
confinement in the penitentiary for a term of not less than eighteen months nor
more than twenty years. Md. Ann. Code art. 27 § 463 (1957).
'Md. Ann. Code art. 41 § 124 (1957). This section was amended in 1961 so that
it is now the obligation of the Parole Board to consider the prisoner's eligibility
for parole after he has served one-fourth of his sentence. Md. Ann. Code art. 41

§

124

(Supp.

1962).

4Md. Ann. Code art. 41 § 120 (1957). "The Governor ... may commute or
change the sentence of any person from imprisonment in the Maryland Penitentiary
to imprisonment for a like or less period in the Maryland House of Correction.
And... he may pardon any person, convicted of crime, on such condition as
he may prescribe, or he may ... remit any part of the time for which any person
may be sentenced to imprisonment on such like conditions without such remission
operating as a full pardon to any such person."
OMd. Ann. Code art. 27 §§ 645A-645J (Supp. 1962). This art is commented on
in ig Md. L. Rev. 233 (1959). For a discussion of post conviction remedies in the
different states see Note, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 681 (1961).
7State v. Shoemaker, 225 Md. 639, 171 A.2d 468 (1961). After sentencing, the
defendant asked his attorney to file an appeal, but the attorney withdrew at the
request of the defendant's wife before doing so. The defendant's wife engaged
another attorney who initiated an appeal, but, not having received his agreed fee,
failed to follow it through. During this entire time, a period of three years, the
defendant was unaware that he was no longer represented by his original attorney
and that no appeal had been taken.
Si8o A.2d at 685.
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At the outset, a distinction should be drawn between remarks made
by the court in response to a jury inquiry and remarks made by the
prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury.
While some courts apply the same rules of error to references made
by the trial judge and the prosecuting attorney,9 most courts draw a
distinction between the two. The majority of American courts hold
that an explanation by the trial judge of the effect of sentence and
the executive discretion thereon is a permissible response to inquiries
from the jury, 10 but most courts hold it to be reversible error for the
prosecuting attorney to refer to the possibility of parole or pardon."l
The primary distinction lies in the fact that when the jury inquires
into the possibility of an early release of the defendant, the subject is
obviously at the fore of their deliberations and whether or not their
questions are answered, the subject will still persist in their minds.
Quite a different situation exists when it is the prosecuting attorney
who introduces the subject, especially since the jury may then feel
that the possibility of parole or pardon is a proper consideration-in
reaching a verdict.
In considering whether or not statements regarding possible parole
or pardon constitute a ground for reversal it is important to bear in
mind the "harmless error" rule, for even if the court thinks that the
prosecuting attorney's statements were improper, still, most courts will
not grant a reversal unless it is found that the remarks were so prejudicial to the defendant that they adversely affected the verdict.12 In
the Shoemaker case, the majority of the court held that the state atOSee Annot., 132 A.L.R. 679 (1941); Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 769 (1954).
"Mallory v. United States, 236 F.2d 7oi (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds,
354 U.S.449 (1957); Glover v. State, 211 Ark. 1002o, 204 S.W.2d 373 (1947); Griffith
v. State, 157 Neb. 448, 59 N.W.2d 701 (1953); State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65

(1958) (court set out model statement to be given jury); Nelson v. Cox, 66 N.M.
397, 349 P.2d 118 (196o) (habeas corpus proceeding); Liska v. State, 115 Ohio St.
283, 152 N.E. 667 (1926); State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542 (1937). Contra,
McCray. v. State, 261 Ala. 275, 74 So. 2d 491 (1954); Jones v. Commonwealth, 194
Va. 273, 72 S.E.2d 693 (1952).
2
Blackwell v. State, 76 Fla. 124, 79 So. 73, (1918); People v. Klapperich, 370 111.
588, 19 N.E.2d 579 (1939); State v. Clark, 196 Iowa 1134, 196 N.W. 82 (1923); Powell
v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 234, 123 S.W.2d 279 (1938); State v. Johnson, 151 La.
625, 92 So. 139 (1922); State v. Dockrey, 238 N.C. 222, 77 S.E.2d 664 (1953); Gray
v. State, 191 Tenn. 5i6, 235 S.W.2d 2o (1950). Contra, State v. Jordan, 8o Ariz.
193, 294 P.2d 677 (i956); Gransinger v. State, i6i Neb. 419, 73 N.W.2d 632 (x955).

22See Note, 39 Va. L. Rev. 85 (1953). Tennessee incorporates the rule by statute.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-117 (1955). "No verdict.. .shall be set aside or new trial
granted... for error... unless ... after an examination of the entire record...

it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has affected the results of
the trial."
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torney's remarks were improper and that their likely effect on the
jury's verdict was prejudicial to the defendant. However, one judge
dissented 13 stating that he would affirm the judgment and sentence
because he felt that the probable prejudice to the defendant would
be negligible.
Among the states which allow the jury a function in fixing the
4
penalty by returning a verdict with or without a recommendation,
Georgia and California have dealt with the question by legislative
enactment coupled with judicial decision.
In Georgia, prior to 1955, the courts held that references by the
prosecuting attorney to parole or pardon were not grounds for reversal.' r The Supreme Court of Georgia in Strickland v. State16 affirmed a conviction of murder, holding such remarks to be proper in
view of the jury's discretion in recommending or failing to recommend mercy. The court went on to say that: "This question is so well
settled by the decisions of this court that it should no longer be open
to doubt." 17 Two years after the 1953 decision in the Strickland case,
the state legislature upset the settled judicial doctrine and enacted a
statute prohibiting any attorney from making any reference to parole,
pardon or executive clemency in argument to the jury.' 8 The statute
has been held to have established the policy of law that the question
of parole or pardon is not to be considered by the jury in their determination of guilt and punishment. 19
The usual character of criminal procedure developed in California has made it possible to deal with the problem somewhat differently. Prior to 1957, in cases in which the statutory penalty was death
"Judge Hammond dissented. Judges Prescott, Homey and Sybert joined Chief
Judge Brune in the majority opinion.
"For a comprehensive list of states which have statutes providing for jury
recommendations see Annot., 17 A.L.R. 1117 (1922); Annot. 87 A.L.R. 1362 (1933);

Annot., 138 A.L.R. 123o (1942).
'1 cLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55,

52 S.E.2d 294 (1949).

82o9 Ga. 675, 75 S.E.2d 6 (1953).

1775 S.E.2d

at 8.

"Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2206 (Supp. 1961).
"McGruder v. State, 213 Ga. 259, 98 S.E.2d 564 (1957). Referring to the statute
cited in note 18 supra, the court said: "This act... establishes the policy of the law.
that the jury should not be influenced ... in the rendition of their verdict by a
consideration of the fact that the penalty imposed by them might be commuted
by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles." 98 S.E.2d at 569.
It is worth noting what the court said about the legislature upsetting the
judicial doctrine. In McKuhen v. State, 216 Ga. 172, 115 S.E.2d 330 (196o), Chief
Justice Duckworth said: "And while the writer has repeatedly indicated his belief
that the jury should know the full meaning of the sentence, the legislature has
fixed it otherwise and we must conform thereto." 115 S.E.2d at 331.
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or life iiiprisonment in the alternative, the jury determined the penalty
in addition to the defendant's guilt, the references to parole or pardon
were held to be permissible as relating to the penalty, but not in
regard to the determination of guilt. 20 In 1957, the California legislature enacted a statute requiring the jury to make a separate determination of the defendant's guilt prior to any consideration of
punishment. 21 The statute further provides that if the jury returns
a verdict of guilty, a further proceeding is initiated whereby the jury
determines the punishment. Since the enactment of this statute, the
court has held that it is permissible for the prosecuting attorney to
refer to the possibility of parole or pardon after a verdict of guilty has
22
been rendered, while the jury is considering the punishment.
Most states, however, have relied solely upon judicial decision in regard to the propriety or impropriety of such references made by the
23
prosecuting attorney.
States in which the jury has no function in determining the punishment have almost universally considered such statements improper
and grounds for reversal. 24 The problem is more complex in states
where the jury has a function in fixing the penalty, for it can be
argued that while the subjects of parole, pardon or executive clemency
have no bearing on a determination of guilt, they do relate to punishment in the sense that the jury should be allowed to consider the
23
effect of the punishment they are to impose.
26
While the weight of authority favors the "harmless error" rule,
some jurisdictions hold that while such remarks are improper, they
do not constitute grounds for reversal if the trial court has admonished
the jury to disregard them, 2 7 or if the court finds that the evidence
clearly supports the verdict and it appears that the jury in all probability would have rendered a verdict of guilty even in the absence of
28
the prosecuting attorney's improper remarks.
2People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 3o5 P.2d 1 (1956); People v. Barclay, 40 Col.
2d 146, 252 P.2d 321 (1953).
2Cal. Pen. Code § 19o.1.
2People v. Robillard, 55 Cal. 2d 62o, 335 P.2d 678 (1959).

2'See generally, 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1107 (1961).
5'People v. Klapperich, 370 Ill. 588, 19 N.E.2d 579 (1939); People v. Sherwood,
271 N.Y. 427, 3 N.E.2d 581 (1936).

"State v. Rombolo, 89 N.J.L. 565, 99 Atl. 434 (Ct. Err. & App. 1916); see note
SUpra.
"See note 12 supra.
TFhackston v. State, 2o5 Ark. 493, 169 S.W.2d 13o (1943); Jones v. State, 22o
Ind. 384, 43 NE.2d 1017 (1942).
"State v. Kingsley, 137 Ore. 3o5, 2 P.2d 3 (1931); State v. Buttry, igg Wash. 228,
22

9 P.2d 1026 (1939).

